

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 23 March 2012 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, I have the honour to refer to paragraph 5 of resolution 2017 (2011), by which the Council:

“[r]equest[ed] the Committee [...], with assistance from its Panel of Experts, and in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, and working with other relevant United Nations bodies, including the International Civil Aviation Organization, and in consultation with international and regional organizations and entities, to assess the threats and challenges, in particular related to terrorism, posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, from Libya in the region, and to submit a report to the Council on proposals to counter th[at] threat, and to prevent the proliferation of arms and related materiel, including, inter alia, measures to secure th[o]se arms and related materiel, to ensure that stockpiles are managed safely and securely, to strengthen border control and to enhance transport security;”.

In this connection, I transmit herewith the report adopted by the Committee (see annex).

The Committee would like to emphasize the primary responsibility of the Libyan authorities, as well as of the States in the region, for the prevention of the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable air defence systems, from Libya, including through the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and of the recommendations contained in the attached report.

The Committee also notes that, in its resolution 2022 (2011), the Council decided that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya shall, in coordination and consultation with the transitional Government of Libya, assist and support Libyan national efforts, taking into account, among other things, the report referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 2017 (2011).



I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) José Filipe **Moraes Cabral**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya

Annex

Consolidated working document on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2017 (2011) 16 March 2012

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 2017 (2011), paragraph 5, requested the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) with assistance from its Panel of Experts, and in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, and working with other relevant United Nations bodies, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and in consultation with international and regional organizations and entities, to assess the threats and the challenges, in particular related to terrorism, posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable air defence systems, from Libya in the region, and to submit a report to the Council on proposals to counter this threat and to prevent the proliferation of arms and related materiel, including, inter alia, measures to secure these arms and related materiel, to ensure that stockpiles are managed safely and securely, to strengthen border control and to enhance transport security. Following the issuance of the resolution, the Committee met with the Panel of Experts in December and other entities to discuss the role of each organization and entity in implementing paragraph 5 of resolution 2017 (2011).

2. The Committee therefore requested the Panel of Experts to prepare a working document on the implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2017 (2011) that would incorporate inputs from the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, ICAO and other relevant entities. In accordance with the request of the Committee, the Panel produced the present working document, which includes the aforementioned inputs and the Panel's input based on interviews conducted with Libyan officials and UNSMIL during the period from June 2011 to January 2012. The input of the Panel is also based on further consultations conducted with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and international bodies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The work undertaken by the United Nations/African Union assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis in the Sahel region conducted in December 2011 is also reflected in the working document.

3. The findings are based on an assessment of the situation within Libya, the subregion and the Sahel. The working paper focuses primarily on the threat related to North and West Africa, including the Sahel region, because those are areas that were visited by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Panel.

4. The working document therefore provides the following:

(a) An assessment of the threats posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel in Libya. In that regard, the working document focuses on conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and challenges related to weapons control;

(b) An assessment of the threats posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel in the subregion and the Sahel region. The working document focuses on pre-existing factors of insecurity and unrest in the subregion; current changes in insecurity dynamics in the Sahel region and the impact of the Libyan crisis; terrorist groups and arms in the Sahel;

(c) Recommendations to counter the threat and prevent the proliferation of arms and related materiel in Libya and the subregion. The working document focuses on the safety and security of weapons and related materiel at storage sites and during transport, controlling man-portable air defence systems, explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance and risk education, the disarmament, the demobilization and the reintegration of brigades, enacting national and international legislation, strengthening border control mechanisms, strengthening regional cooperation and exchange of information.

Summary of findings

5. To date, no man-portable air defence systems originating from Libya have been seized outside Libya. Despite this, the working document findings indicate that significant threat variables exist, justifying further measures to mitigate the risk man-portable air defence systems may pose. Action is called for, even in the absence of conclusive evidence of the acquisition of man-portable air defence systems originating from Libya by terrorist groups, given the likelihood that the latent threat would materialize with complete certainty in the event the weapon is utilized with potentially catastrophic results.

6. Simply locating man-portable air defence systems or obtaining evidence of their transfer from Libya is insufficient. A combination of the following factors quantifies more specifically the threat of man-portable air defence systems used as a terrorist weapon: the availability of the necessary materiel; the demand (terrorists seeking weapons) and the economic means of potential buyers; the capacity and the range of the weapon (sophistication of design of the man-portable air defence systems); the operational status of the weapon's various components (functionality of the batteries, seekers and launchers); the ability to operate the weapon properly; and the ability to access potential targets.

7. With regard to the proliferation of weapons other than man-portable air defence systems, there is clear evidence of significant quantities of weapons having left Libya during the conflict, particularly small arms and light weapons and associated ammunition, as well as explosives. The lack of control over brigades and their stockpiles by a national command structure and gross deficiencies in stockpile management and security are all factors that contribute to the risk of illicit proliferation both within and outside Libya. The economic value of weaponry and the potential need for income, coupled with the lack of authority of the central government and absence of proper border security, are key challenges that could encourage further proliferation outside Libya.

8. The increased supply of weapons and related materiel in the Sahel region is likely to have fuelled pre-existing insecurity, such as terrorist activity, armed criminality and local conflicts, particularly in northern Mali, where a growing armed rebellion has emerged recently with violent confrontations against the national army. Although Security Council resolution 2017 (2011) focuses on an assessment of the threats and the challenges posed by the proliferation of all arms, it is also important

to highlight the recent increased destabilization of the Sahel region, which also is likely linked to the significant exodus of groups hosted by the former Qadhafi government returning with weapons, including to Mali and the Sudan.

9. A range of initiatives aimed at addressing the weapons security deficiencies within Libya have been designed and implemented by the authorities supported by international actors. Over 120 weapons storage sites have been visited and an estimated 5,000 man-portable air defence systems missiles have been accounted for. A more comprehensive inventory would likely result in the recovery of additional man-portable air defence systems. While the current lack of extension of national authority to armed actors limits the implementation of these measures for the time being, some local initiatives are being put in place at the neighbourhood and the brigade levels. This tends to indicate that all levels of authorities need to be engaged in the overall efforts to control weapons and combat illicit trafficking.

10. At the regional level, addressing the threat related to the illicit arms proliferation from Libya necessitates the enhancement of measures to combat illicit trafficking that already exist. Controlling weapons and their use involves a multilayered approach and a vast array of activities that can contribute to addressing these issues. It is beyond the scope of this document to provide a comprehensive list of current efforts related to illicit arms trafficking in the Sahel region. However, in order to address the specific threat of arms proliferation from Libya, regional authorities, including Libyan, and international partners have recommended that attention should be given at the regional level to strengthening border control, enhancing regional cooperation and coordination efforts, exchange of information and curbing the specific threat related to man-portable air defence systems.

II. Assessment of the threats posed by the proliferations of all arms and related materiel in Libya

A. Conventional weapons

11. The conflict in Libya and the evolution of control of the territory by the opposition has gradually revealed the very large weapons stocks in Libya, not only in terms of their vast numbers, but also the wide variety of systems and models, including small arms, light weapons, heavy weapons and related ammunition, as well as mines and explosives.

12. The distribution of arms to civilians and the appropriation of the content of weapons storage sites by individuals and brigades resulted in uncontrolled circulation of very large quantities of military materiel during the war. Four months after the end of the conflict, a significant percentage of the civilian population was armed and the brigades controlled large portions of weapons and ammunition stocks.

13. It is important to note that the illicit proliferation of arms, ammunition and related materiel cannot be seen separately from the existing large, often poorly guarded, stockpiles of Government-owned weapons. Improving stockpile management is therefore of the highest priority.

Man-portable air defence systems in Libya

14. Security Council resolution 2017 (2011) refers to the threats and challenges in particular related to man-portable air defence systems. By definition, man-portable air defence systems are short-range surface-to-air missile systems that can shoot down aircraft flying at altitudes under approximately 4.5 km and which therefore present a significant threat to both military and civilian aviation.

15. While an estimate of approximately 20,000 man-portable air defence systems acquired by Libya over the past four decades has been compiled on the basis of information collected on the ground by the United States of America, it is not clear how many existed in Libya before the conflict, and how many are still unaccounted for. According to Human Rights Watch, which was on the ground during the initial stages of the conflict, man-portable air defence systems were among the first items to disappear from storage sites along with other small arms and light weapons. However, because of the no-fly zone and the immobilization of Qadhafi's air force, these weapons were not really needed during the conflict; while some of them may have been fired on occasion either in a surface-to-air or surface-to-surface role, owing to a lack of knowledge of their use, they were not a weapon of choice for military combat.

16. According to the United States and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), over 120 weapons storage sites have been visited and an estimated 5,000 man-portable air defence systems missiles and several hundred launch mechanisms have been accounted for. This estimate represents a portion of the man-portable air defence systems that are believed to have been destroyed by NATO strikes, as well as those that have been disabled by Libyan-led teams supported by international technicians. A more comprehensive inventory that includes excavation of collapsed bunkers would likely result in the recovery of additional man-portable air defence systems. Since December 2011, man-portable air defence systems survey and disablement efforts have slowed as the level of cooperation from groups that control weapons stocks and storage depots has fallen. Furthermore, interviews conducted by the Panel suggest that the international focus on the issue of man-portable air defence systems in Libya may have increased their owners' appreciation of their political weight and potential economic value.

17. Most of the man-portable air defence systems found in Libya are model SA-7b (9K32M), a first generation man-portable air defence system produced in the 1970s and the 1980s in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in Bulgaria and Serbia to a lesser extent. Their age, often poor storage condition and lack of maintenance may have affected the capability of the weapon. However, video reports and other sources have indicated that some man-portable air defence systems have been fired successfully, thus indicating that some are still functioning. According to United States technicians on the ground, the launch tube has also been used to fire other ammunition, such as 57-mm rockets.

18. Another, more potent, surface-to-air short-range missile, the Igla-S (also known as SA-24), is raising concern. Those found in Libya are vehicle-mounted so they cannot be described as man-portable per se. No gripstocks have been found in Libya so far, and in a communication dated 7 December 2011, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations informed the Panel of Experts that "because of its design, these missiles can't be used as man-portable weapons". Delivered in Libya in 2005 and 2006, the missiles are much more

sophisticated than the ones mentioned previously, with some key differences such as an increase in war-head lethality, accuracy, firing range and resistance to countermeasures. While mounted missile launchers may be more difficult to smuggle than man-portable air defence systems, proper control over this materiel is crucial, as the implications of such weapons getting into the hands of terrorists are extremely worrying. There is no evidence of this materiel leaving Libya at this stage.

B. Weapons of mass destruction

19. In 2004, the former Qadhafi regime declared its possession of sulphur mustard gas and associated chemical weapon agent precursors to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and had started to destroy them under the oversight of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; however, the destruction process stopped in February 2011, owing to equipment malfunction, and did not restart because of the burgeoning insurgency. After the conflict, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons deployed inspectors to Libya, in November 2011, with the full cooperation of the Libyan authorities, and concluded that the chemical weapons stocks in the Ruwagha complex at Waddan were accounted for and secure. UNSMIL supported the visit of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through logistics, security and coordination arrangements. Since then, the new Libyan authorities informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that they had discovered two other sites previously undeclared by the former Qadhafi regime containing additional sulphur mustard-filled chemical weapons materials and munitions. Libya has since consolidated all its chemical weapon materials at Ruwagha, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons sent inspectors to the Ruwagha site a second time in January 2012 to verify previously undeclared chemical weapons materials and concluded that they were secure. Libya declared the newly discovered chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on 13 February 2012. The Libyan authorities are working towards submitting to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, by 1 May 2012, a detailed destruction plan for their chemical weapons material.

20. In terms of nuclear-related threats, IAEA conducted a mission in Libya in December 2011 with the support of UNSMIL. The IAEA representatives inspected the Tajura nuclear facility and the yellowcake storage site at Sebha. No previously reported materiel was missing, storage conditions were decent and the sites were secured. While low-enriched fuel and yellowcake do not represent a major concern in terms of security threats, the Libyan authorities are encouraged to maintain strict security measures, particularly to prevent the theft of the high value yellowcake.

C. Challenges related to weapons control

*Kataeb*¹ filling the vacuum of State security

Collapse of State security institutions

21. The uprising in Libya has led to the collapse of many Libyan institutions, including within the security sector, and has provided fertile ground for new armed actors. In this transition phase, armed brigades are providing security in the quasi-absence of operational law enforcement bodies, and civilians tend to see the possession of a weapon as one way of ensuring their protection.

Lack of unified command of kataeb

22. Armed brigades are not under a national unified command structure, which presents a real challenge. Main towns have a military council to which brigades report; however, not all the brigades recognize the authority of the respective military council. Tensions have surfaced particularly in areas where brigades of different regional origins coexist, such as in Tripoli and the surrounding areas, where infighting occurred regularly in the past few months. Some infighting relates also to old rivalries that date back to the time of the former regime, as well as to the perception of certain *kataeb* that brigades from other cities sided with Qadhafi or remained loyal to him.

Kataeb control over most weapons

23. While the stockpiling of weapons by brigades is seen as a response to prevailing or perceived internal and external security threats, the large quantities of weapons they have under their control may contribute to their level of political leverage. This element could actually be considered a mitigating factor against the proliferation of weapons outside Libya. According to representatives of *kataeb* in Zintan and Misrata, while some brigades have stored and secured heavy weaponry, fighters are still responsible for their small arms.

Limited border control

24. The approximately 4,000 km of land border shared with six countries and the 1,700 km of coastline pose a real challenge to Libyan authorities and to the implementation and monitoring of the arms embargo. For the moment, some border control activities are conducted by local brigades, and representatives of brigades from Zintan and Sebha have explained that patrolling is resource-intensive and they need logistical support, mainly in terms of communication. The absence of a regular force to manage the borders has also created tensions with neighbouring authorities, resulting in the closing of crossing points on several occasions, particularly in Tunisia. Weak border controls also present security risks for Libya. Moreover, in a speech to the African Union on 29 January 2012, the Prime Minister of Libya warned that armed remnants of the former regime stationed abroad constituted a threat to Libyan national security.

¹ *Kataeb* is the Arabic term used in Libya to define the fighting units that opposed Qadhafi's forces. These units were generally created on a local basis during the war and do not have standard numbers of fighters or arms. Their sizes vary greatly.

Gross deficiencies in weapons management and security

Absence of State control over weapons

25. The primary long-term challenge is likely to be the overall control of weapons and ammunition stockpiles by a national security force and the restoring of a maximum amount of materiel. Current institutional weaknesses and the valuable stocks of Libyan weapons represent an attractive market for illegal brokers and traders. While national authorities supported by international technicians are currently working on mapping and securing pre-war weapons storage sites, having access to the facilities of *kataeb* is very challenging.

Deficiencies of management and physical security of stockpiles

26. Whether at new storage sites used by *kataeb* or at old depots and armouries that were already in use by the Qadhafi forces, there are a range of technical deficiencies that need to be addressed in order to prevent diversions and accidents such as inappropriate location, and safety and security standards of facilities. For example, explosions resulting from poor storage conditions or the handling of ammunition without appropriate training and safety measures could be extremely damaging, particularly in densely populated areas. An accidental explosion in an ammunition depot killed several people in central Libya on 6 December 2011. In some cases, Qadhafi forces removed large amounts of heavy ammunition and weapons from bunkers and storage sites and dispersed them around sites in an effort to limit the success of NATO strikes on arms depots. As a result, much of this materiel is still lying around and is often unsecured.

Mines and explosives remnants of war

27. Other direct threats to civilians result from the high prevalence of mines in the country. While some are left over from the Second World War and from Libya's war with Chad, others were used during the Libyan crisis and large stocks are still piled in some depots. Contamination of land by explosive remnants of war, particularly in cities like Sirte, where the siege took longer, and around storage sites that were struck by NATO, is of particular concern. This contamination also presents a challenge in terms of potential terrorist use of certain materiel in building improvised explosive devices.

III. Assessment of the threats posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel in the subregion and the Sahel region

28. A mixture of pre-existing conditions, changing local dynamics and new factors generated by the changes in Libya contribute to increased risks of criminality, insurgencies and terrorism in the subregion.

A. Pre-existing factors of insecurity and unrest in the Sahel region

29. Cross-border organized criminality has been a long-term challenge for authorities in the region. The Sahel region has historically hosted important trade

routes, which also drew illegal trafficking of goods, drugs and people. Illicit arms transfers within the region, including both private trafficking networks and Governments supporting foreign groups, are not new.

30. Several countries face the presence of non-State armed groups on their territory. Some have faced violent insurgencies in the recent past, or face them now. In this regard, northern Mali, northern Niger and Darfur are of main concern, particularly for the respective authorities in those countries.

31. Abductions and other violent activities conducted by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb represent huge national security threats and challenges for several countries in the region, particularly Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Nigeria. Terrorism activities are intertwined with other sources of insecurity, such as cross-border criminality and trafficking.

32. Poor physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition in the region has always been a challenge. The presence of large quantities of weapons left over from previous conflicts, the existence of armed groups and trafficking networks, the very large and often difficult territory to control, the limited provision of security by the State, lack of institutional presence in peripheral areas, and the difficulty of implementing international and national physical security and stockpile management best practices are all factors that encourage the illicit proliferation of weapons.

B. Security dynamics in the Sahel region and the impact of the Libyan crisis

33. The peripheral areas of several countries in the Sahel region face numerous, often interrelated, sources of insecurity and are subjected to increasing levels of arms-related activity, including criminality, rebellion and terrorism. The influx of weapons and fighters from Libya aggravates the pre-existing sources of insecurity in those places and has the potential to enhance the capabilities of terrorist and other non-State armed groups.

34. The deterioration of the security situations in northern Mali and northern Niger has resulted in the withdrawal of a large number of United Nations, humanitarian and non-governmental agencies. Local authorities and humanitarian workers in these countries have explained that the absence of State services, coupled with the withdrawal of crucial support from the United Nations and other actors, may have in turn contributed to increased insecurity. Specifically, the resulting political and structural vacuum leaves more space for criminal groups to recruit and explore new territories and for terrorist groups to gain popularity by offering services in lieu of the State. The situation may also allow for further development of recruitment and local support networks for gathering information, supplying arms, ammunition and logistics.

Increase of armed criminality

Arms trafficking

35. Authorities of neighbouring countries have noticed an increase in illicit weapons trafficking since the Libyan crisis. Over the last few months, the army and security forces of the Niger have participated in several military operations against

armed groups in the north. Some of the convoys came from Libya. Several of the suspects were killed during the operations, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb members, and significant quantities of weapons were seized, including assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft heavy machine guns mounted on vehicles, ammunition, grenades and explosives (SEMTEX). Neighbouring countries also informed the Panel about new regular “ant trade” dynamics coming out of Libya. While this type of trafficking is on a small scale, it could represent very significant quantities in the long run and pose challenges. Finally, during the United Nations mission in the Sahel, conducted in close cooperation with the African Union in December 2011, some authorities indicated that weapons may be hidden in the desert in order to be used later by rebel movements and/or sold, possibly to terrorist groups like Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram or to criminal organizations.

36. During its participation in the United Nations mission of December 2011, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate held discussions with officials from Mali, the Niger, Chad and Mauritania, who all confirmed that no man-portable air defence systems were collected or seized during the different operations, including military ones, against armed groups. The Panel of Experts arrived at the same conclusion following its missions to five of the countries neighbouring Libya.

Armed robberies

37. According to national authorities and United Nations country teams in Mali and the Niger, armed robberies and criminal activities increased dramatically in the last few months in parallel with an increased level of economic hardship. Food insecurity is on the rise owing to poor harvests and the withdrawal of international aid from deprived and insecure areas in peripheral regions. Increased economic hardship is likely to have a negative impact on criminality. Crimes have increased notably in northern Mali since the onset of the Libyan crisis, including as a result of the availability of arms and the increased pressure on already destitute local communities brought on by the high number of returnees. The authorities also feared that these conditions would provide fertile ground for organized criminals to successfully recruit, especially young men.

Resumption of insurgency

38. The return of armed fighters to their countries of origin during the Libyan conflict and following the collapse of the regime may have contributed to the destabilization of areas that faced insurgencies in the past. The exact impact is difficult to quantify. For example, while some rebel dynamics were evident in northern Mali for some time, it is difficult to assess the influence of the fighters and the weapons that came out of Libya on current violent events. The estimated number of fighters varies from several hundred to 4,000. According to interviews conducted by the Panel in January 2012 with the Malian security forces, intelligence sources, Tuareg and other civilian representatives, including people who met directly with those groups, the fighters who arrived from Libya are heterogeneous: not all sympathize with the rebellion dynamics in northern Mali. However, the same sources also explained that the arrival of significant quantities of weapons, light weapons in particular, including those mounted on vehicles, and armed fighters, some of whom may indeed be participating in the current armed violence, may have been an encouraging factor for predatory behaviour, often masked as a rebellion.

The visible influx of new manpower and weaponry instilled activists with a new sense of capacity to challenge the State forces and also increased the concerns of the Government.

39. Finally, the new sources of insecurity that regional authorities currently face are not the only consequence of the Libyan crisis. The fall of the regime has undoubtedly modified the regional security landscape by bringing to an end financial and military support from Qadhafi to different groups in the wider region. This has the potential to alter the dynamic in relation to arms and power in different countries.

Recent increase in terrorist activity in the Sahel region

40. Terrorist attacks have increased in the last few months, and the potential acquisition of weapons from Libya by terrorist cells is likely to increase their capacities to conduct activities, expand their territory of activity, strengthen their links with criminal trafficking networks and confront regular armies. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram pose the greatest threat among known terrorist actors in the region. It is beyond the scope of this document to analyse the full spectrum of past and present factors contributing to an increased terrorist threat. The following are threats that the Panel deems particularly important. They have been raised repeatedly to the Panel and to other relevant international actors.

Abductions and expansion of territory of activities

41. Since 2003, 53 persons have been taken hostage by terrorist organizations in the Sahel region, such as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), which is now referred to as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Abductions have recently increased in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has traditionally been operating mostly in the northern Sahel areas; however, it has recently expanded its area of activity southwards.

42. While terrorist activity was previously largely contained within the northern part of the Niger, in January 2011 two European citizens were abducted in the centre of Niamey. In Mauritania, authorities explained that, while no cells of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb were based in Mauritania, a Mauritanian policeman had been abducted at the border between Mali and Mauritania in December 2011, in retaliation for the military operations that had been carried by the Mauritanian army in Mali. Finally, most cells of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb are based in northern Mali and, while the country has been relatively free of abductions, the end of 2011 was marked by the abductions of five European citizens in Hombari and Timbuktu, representing a strategic shift for the organization.

Recruitment, new cells and interactions between groups

43. According to different national authorities and security analysts, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has been actively recruiting in the Sahel and West Africa regions lately, and there has recently been an increase in the emergence of a number of new terrorist cells, particularly in Mali. It is as yet unclear whether these are original distinct groups or groups splintering off from existing movements, and it is difficult to establish their actual size and territorial control. Although intelligence sources, analysts and national authorities have indicated that there are degrees of

internal and cross-border interaction between groups, the degree of coordination between them is still unclear.

44. Regional and international intelligence services reported to the Panel that members of Boko Haram came to northern Mali in 2011 to receive training with a cell of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. It is unclear whether this example is representative of a wider trend. Participants of the United Nations mission of December 2011 were told that seven members of Boko Haram were arrested while transiting through the Niger to Mali in possession of material on manufacturing of explosives, propaganda and names of members of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and were, according to authorities of the Niger, planning to join Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. However, when visiting Nigeria, the Minister of Defence stated that Boko Haram constituted purely an internal Nigerian phenomenon.

Cooperation between terrorist and criminal networks

45. During the United Nations mission of December 2011, some officials of the States visited indicated that a level of cooperation may be found in some areas between drug traffickers and members of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb particularly in the demand for taxes to pass through certain areas. Other officials, however, maintained that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Tuareg, already engaged in rebel activities in northern Mali, may fight for the control of specific parts of the region.

46. According to the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Boko Haram has acquired weapons from States of the Sahel region and Central Africa and finances its operations through the proceeds of illicit firearms trading and smuggling and daily levies paid by members, as well as donations by individuals and organizations within and outside Nigeria.

47. Finally, authorities and intelligence sources in Mali and the Niger told the Panel that some of the abductions by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb mentioned above are likely to have been conducted by criminal “subcontractors”, demonstrating that some core terrorist activities are also carried out in coordination with local criminal networks.

C. Arms and terrorist groups in the region

Weapons sought by terrorist groups

48. It is difficult to formulate a precise picture of weapons possession among terrorist groups in the region; however, according to expert analysts and authorities who the Panel has met in the region, basic small arms are not difficult for groups to obtain, and they are looking to acquire more sophisticated small arms and light weapons, as well as ammunition and explosives. These are easily portable and can therefore be transported across large distances in the desert. While concerns about man-portable air defence systems are very serious, authorities in the region and security agencies around the globe have acknowledged the fact that other weapons that are largely available in Libya, such as explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided weapons and heavy machine guns, are likely to be particularly attractive for use in insurgencies and to increase the capacity of armed or terrorist groups to fight regular military forces.

49. During the interception of a convoy in the Niger arriving from Libya in June 2011, which resulted in a violent exchange with security forces, significant quantities of SEMTEX explosive (640 kg), 435 detonators and \$90,000 were seized. Authorities of the Niger alleged that the explosives were destined for Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb camps in northern Mali. Two vehicles, which were allegedly transporting more military materiel, managed to escape arrest. These military seizures appear to suggest that terrorist organizations may have been acquiring arms, weapons and explosives from Libyan military stockpiles. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb leader Belmokhtar² claimed that they had indeed acquired weapons from Libya. While this information has been corroborated by additional credible sources, there is no concrete evidence to prove this at this stage.

50. Libyan stockpiles are not the only potential sources of military materiel, including man-portable air defence systems, for terrorist groups and other armed groups in the Sahel. Weapons can enter the illegal markets in different ways, including through the deliberate transfer from a State to an armed group, the dispersion of materiel following the collapse of a State, the seizure of materiel on the battlefield or theft from manufacturers or from poorly managed State stockpiles. Man-portable air defence systems are believed to be part of the arsenals of numerous countries,³ including some in the subregion, whose stockpile security measures are not always up to standard.

Assessing the threat of terrorist attacks with man-portable air defence systems in the region

51. Approximately 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by a man-portable air defence systems missile since the 1970s.⁴ Certain non-State armed groups are already known for having used man-portable air defence systems in the region. In 1988, rebels of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguira al-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario) fired man-portable air defence systems at two DC-7 aircraft. Both aircraft were hit, one of which crashed, killing five people.⁵ Some regional terrorist groups are also believed to possess man-portable air defence systems, including in Algeria and Lebanon.⁶ There is no evidence that man-portable air defence systems have left Libya since the beginning of the crisis, and we do not know if Al-Qaida in

² See Aboul Maaly, "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou Al-Abass, alias 'Belaouar'", *Nouackchott Info*, 10 November 2011.

³ In 2004, an estimated 105 countries possessed man-portable air defence systems; see Kenneth Epps, "MANPADS and Small Arms Control" (*Ploughshares*, 2004).

⁴ For lists of previous man-portable air defence system attacks, see Eric Berman and Jonah Leff, "Light Weapons: Products, Producers and Proliferation" in *Small Arms Survey 2008: risk and resilience*; James Bevan and Matt Schroeder, "Man-portable Air Defence Systems" in James Bevan, ed., *Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide* (Small Arms Survey, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Federation of American Scientists, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité and South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2008).

⁵ United States Government, Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, "MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defence Systems" fact sheet (2008).

⁶ For a list of terrorist groups that are believed to possess man-portable air defence systems, see Loren Thompson, "MANPADS, Scale and Nature of Threat" (Lexington Institute, 2003); for a list of non-State armed groups that reportedly held man-portable air defence systems see Eric Berman and Jonah Leff, "Light Weapons: Products, Producers and Proliferation" in *Small Arms Survey 2008: risk and resilience*, pp. 32-33.

the Islamic Maghreb or Boko Haram possessed man-portable air defence systems before the Libyan uprising or have acquired any since.

52. Assessing the level of threat related to the acquisition and use of man-portable air defence systems by regional terrorist groups requires analysing a number of different interrelated factors, including the following:

(a) Availability: The potential availability of man-portable air defence systems is influenced, inter alia, by the existence of uncontrolled weapons in Libya, porous borders and existing trafficking networks that include links between local populations that transcend those borders. Like other light weapons, man-portable air defence systems are of a relatively small size, easy to transport and conceal, factors that make them appropriate items for smuggling activities;

(b) Demand: As a result of criminal financial activity, including profitable kidnappings, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb potentially has ample resources available to purchase military materiel. Still, the demand for and intent to use these weapons are difficult to evaluate. While man-portable air defence systems could be used by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb groups to defend themselves against military air operations conducted by security forces or to conduct high-impact strikes against civilian aircraft, the true nature of these groups' current strategy and intentions is unknown;

(c) Operational capacities: The capacities of the group to operate the weapons effectively are unclear. According to expert analysts working on Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, some members of the group have received military training and have therefore enough background to use man-portable air defence systems. While only some training is required to operate a man-portable air defence system, some practice is likely to be required to successfully shoot down an aircraft, especially if the materiel is old, like most of the man-portable air defence systems found in Libya. Capacities to gauge target range and other factors, such as speed, are also required;

(d) State of weapon: A complete system requires several component parts that do not come together in the same crate; for example, for the SA-7b found in Libya, a gripstock will not be delivered in the same box as launch tubes and batteries. Secondly, most man-portable air defence systems found in Libya were produced around 30 years ago and there is a high chance that their age, probable poor storage conditions and lack of maintenance would have affected their operational capability. Nevertheless, different reports have shown that several of these weapons have indeed been fired successfully, and it is therefore difficult to make any definitive judgement about the likelihood of their "successful" operational use. The unsuccessful man-portable air defence systems attack conducted in Mombasa in 2002 by Al-Qaida in East Africa actually included 2 SA-7b that had been produced in 1978;⁷

(e) Access to target: The shooter will need to be able to see the aircraft for the duration of the attack. This presents authorities with an opportunity to mitigate that threat if appropriate measures are deployed to secure airports.

53. While an attack on an aircraft would have severe human consequences and direct and indirect economic costs, as well as a huge psychological impact, the

⁷ See S/2003/1035, p. 29.

simple confirmation that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb or other terrorist groups have actually managed to acquire man-portable air defence systems would in itself have important security, financial and psychological impacts. In some interviews, the Panel was told that the discovery of man-portable air defence systems would not be easily made public as the economic consequences for the region in terms of disrupted air transport, trade and tourism would be catastrophic.

IV. Areas of focus and recommendations to counter the threat

54. Since its creation and according to its mandate pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), the Panel of Experts has been gathering, examining and analysing information in and outside Libya regarding the implementation of the arms embargo, including information about security, armed actors and weapons circulation. Should the Security Council renew the mandate of the Panel, the Panel would continue these activities in the manner defined by its new mandate.

55. It should be emphasized that the prevention of the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable air defence systems, from Libya, including through the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, is the primary responsibility of the Libyan authorities and States of the region.

56. The Panel compiled the following recommendations and areas of focus representing its own conclusions and inputs in the respective areas of expertise of the international organizations outlined in Security Council resolution 2017 (2011) (ICAO, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate); discussions with Libyan and regional authorities and international actors who are supporting post-conflict efforts in Libya; and additional consultations with UNSMIL, the United Nations Office for Disarmament, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and IAEA.

A. Areas of focus and recommendations to counter the threat in Libya

57. Supported by a range of international partners, the Libyan national authorities are taking measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons and other risks that are related to the uncontrolled circulation and ownership of weapons. However, the current lack of extension of central authority to armed actors and their weapons limit the full implementation of those national efforts for the moment. Some efforts of control over weapons are conducted locally by civilian and brigade authorities.

Importance of coordination of efforts to counter the proliferation threat

58. For the past four months, UNSMIL has played a key role in coordinating international efforts aimed at supporting the Libyan authorities on conventional and non-conventional arms-related issues. A specific operational group, co-chaired by the Ministry of Defence and UNSMIL, has been established in order to coordinate and align the efforts of the international community with those of the Libyan authorities. UNSMIL plays a leading role in analysing, monitoring and coordinating activities that are aimed at identifying, verifying, registering and eventually controlling arms and related materiel. UNSMIL stated that the new special adviser on arms proliferation and border security, who reports to both the Department of

Political Affairs and UNSMIL, will ensure further coordination of action between the Libyan authorities and international partners and will work closely with the authorities in neighbouring countries and regional organizations in order to monitor and address the concerns related to the proliferation of arms.

Safety and security of weapons

59. Urgent measures to secure weapons in storage sites under the control of the Ministry of Defence and other authorities in order to prevent proliferation and physical accidents include the following:

- (a) Physical security of conventional and non-conventional weapons and ammunition sites;
- (b) Collection and re-storage of abandoned materiel;
- (c) Demining and destruction of mines stocks;
- (d) Explosive ordnance disposal;
- (e) Resumption of stockpile destruction of sulphur mustard agent, precursor chemicals, and related chemical weapon munitions and materiel and ensuring the security of these chemical weapons pending destruction.

60. According to a member of the Libyan National Mine Action Centre, which has just been created by the Ministry of Defence to coordinate these efforts, the general plan to secure weapons storage depots is to sort through ammunition and weapons, create an inventory, decide what is good to keep or destroy, destroy ammunition for which there are no associated weapons and weapons for which ammunition is no longer available, disable and destroy what is not needed or obsolete and arrange appropriate storage. Such efforts are meant to start in the coming weeks and last several years. In this context, it should be noted that generally it is far better to destroy surplus and obsolete weapons than to store them. The final decision about how to proceed with the existing weapons and ammunition in the country rests with the Libyan authorities.

61. In the long term, Libyan authorities would like to implement a physical security and stockpile management type programme in order to manage and secure weapons and ammunition. In coordination with the Libyan authorities, United Nations and international partner contractors will start undertaking assessments of storage sites in the next few weeks, making recommendations and undertaking limited rehabilitation activities where possible. Longer term activities will be the responsibility of the Government of Libya.

62. Alongside future arms collection and storage efforts, careful consideration will need to be given to transportation methods and appropriate safety measures applied to avoid further diversions and explosions.

63. Given the particular challenges regarding ammunition management, Libyan authorities may wish to make use of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines recently developed within the United Nations on the basis of a mandate by the General Assembly.⁸

⁸ See www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/.

Controlling man-portable air defence systems

64. The Ministry of Defence, with support from UNSMIL and the international community led by the United States, has started co-hosting an operational sub-group comprising the different actors working on mapping man-portable air defence systems and other related tasks. The United Nations mission has also recruited a man-portable air defence systems expert. Supported by American and other international technicians, the authorities had started mapping the location of man-portable air defence systems and disabling some of them. More than 120 sites have been inspected to date and an estimated 5,000 man-portable air defence systems have been accounted for. Since late 2011, access to storage depots under the control of *kataeb* has proved to be more difficult.

65. While it is not clear how many of the man-portable air defence systems in Libya are under the control of the army, *kataeb* or other entities, raising awareness about the importance of securing these weapons, and other related materiel, among individuals known to control these items is crucial. Controlling stockpiles of man-portable air defence systems requires strict physical security and stockpile management procedures. While measures do not differ from managing other small arms and light weapons and include inventories, maintenance, physical security and access controls, some specific best practices exist, including the separate storage of missiles and firing units when the weapon design allows it. Managing man-portable air defence systems stocks also involves the potential destruction of excess or obsolete man-portable air defence systems.

Explosive ordnance disposal and mine risk education

66. Decontamination efforts, primarily required to protect the population, are ongoing and provide an opportunity to recuperate elements used to build improvised explosive devices. Education about the dangers of mines and other explosive remnants of war is crucial to prevent casualties. International support is highly appreciated by the Libyan authorities and population.

67. During the conflict, the National Transitional Council took an important step against landmines by releasing a communiqué that requested forces under its command to destroy all landmines, and by encouraging the future Government to join the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. While some mines have been destroyed with the help of international partners, significant numbers still exist, including those under the control of some *kataeb*, and accessing their holdings remains a challenge.

68. Finally, national authorities also indicated to the United Nations Mission of December 2011 that some border areas, particularly in the Tibesti area between Chad and Libya, have also been infested with mines. Many of these mines have been buried and their locations are not well known. They thus represent a substantial danger to the local population and returnees. Armed groups might also be interested in using them for criminal purposes. The Government of Chad mentioned to the Mission a request for assistance in their removal.

Controlling weapons ownership

69. Different national and local weapons registration and control efforts are being implemented and planned, reflecting the complex and varied tools needed for effective weapons control within the country.

Controlling civilian ownership

70. At the local level, as a result of the population concerns of uncontrolled civilian arms ownership and circulation, some community authorities, including religious entities, have organized basic registration initiatives.

71. In the long term, the authorities are considering a weapons-collection type programme aimed at civilians; however, they stress that the reception and the success of such a programme will largely depend on timing and the context in which it will be carried out. The return of a real sense of security and the rule of law among the population, trust in an official and exhaustive programme that is applicable to everyone, and effectiveness of the security forces are just some aspects that are critical to the success of such a programme.

Controlling weapons ownership of members of kataeb

72. According to interviews with the Zintan Military Council and representatives of *kataeb* in Misrata, it does not appear that military councils have instituted an arms registration process. Interlocutors explained that brigades have stored the heavy weaponry and ensured the effective management and security of their own stocks, but do not control privately owned small arms.

73. At the national level, efforts are conducted to register the weapons of ex-combatants. The Warriors' Commission for Rehabilitation and Development is currently registering ex-combatants through its 37 branches throughout the territory. Each ex-combatant has to fill out a form, providing his personal details, and indicate the private or security sector into which he would like to be reintegrated as well as the type of the weapon he owns and the serial number. According to the Commission, the process will be completed in February 2012. Finally, the process of re-forming the security sector by creating new national security and defence bodies is likely to play a critical post-conflict role through absorbing numbers of ex-combatants and controlling their weapons. Proper recordkeeping by the Libyan authorities will help to ensure arms control within Libya and effective tracing of the arms should the weapons fall into the hands of terrorists or criminals. Records should include information regarding the type, the model, the calibre of arms and any identification markings, including serial numbers. Markings, recordkeeping and other controls of arms should be done in conformity with the United Nations International Tracing Instrument.

Enacting national and international legislation

74. Weapons proliferation, and the consequent increase in weapons possession by individuals and brigades outside the control of the central government, calls for the adoption of new legislation. Furthermore, the new Libyan authorities must comply with international regulations aimed at controlling arms, including the implementation of and compliance with the arms embargo on Libya.

75. Eventually, the Libyan authorities could consider submitting an overview of the country's national holdings of conventional arms to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.⁹ Such a baseline assessment could effectively assist a discussion on which weapons systems the armed forces should procure once the arms embargo has ended.

76. Finally, Libya could eventually commit to providing national data on military expenditures to the existing database of the United Nations.¹⁰ For countries where defence sector reform is planned, reporting a breakdown of existing military expenditures may provide a starting point for discussing present priorities in military spending, which can constitute a sensible and transparent start of the reform process.

B. Areas of focus and recommendations to counter the threat of illicit arms proliferation in the subregion and in the Sahel region

77. While programmes and efforts aimed at addressing illicit weapons proliferation and related security threats in the region vary from local social and development programmes to national security sector reform and regional defence cooperation, this section highlights only the regional measures of priority that have repeatedly been identified by regional authorities and international actors.

Strengthening border control

Libyan border control efforts

78. With the lifting of the no-fly zone and the termination of the monitoring of the arms embargo by NATO, the transportation of goods is returning to normal. For this reason, the threat of illicit proliferation of military materiel across Libya's borders has increased and the Libyan authorities need to reinforce the control of goods being transported by land, sea and air. So far, some brigades are conducting border control activities; those who met with the Panel highlighted their lack of logistical means and resources.

79. The Libyan Ministry of Defence has established an agency that is in charge of border security and protection of strategic locations. The Ministry of the Interior is complementing these efforts by managing the civilian aspects of the border regime along with the Ministry of Finances and the Customs Service. UNSMIL is working closely with all relevant authorities and key bilateral and international partners in ensuring integrated planning between the different parts of the government and in coordinating international assistance to the Libyan efforts. Finally, a national border control assessment is going to take place in the following months, including ports and airports, with the support of the European Union and other partners.

Regional efforts

80. The States neighbouring Libya that the Panel visited, including Tunisia, Egypt and the Niger, are taking action to counter the illicit proliferation of arms emanating from Libya by enhancing border surveillance through the deployment of additional patrols and air operations. Inspections of transport vehicles and cargo at border

⁹ See www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register.

¹⁰ See www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex.

checkpoints have also been reinforced. However, according to the authorities of the above-mentioned neighbouring States, monitoring capabilities are still often insufficient to cope with the long and porous borders, resources for patrols are scarce, and checkpoints and cross-border cooperation is very limited. The authorities of the Niger stated that they were proactively seeking financial and logistical support to help them address this situation. Finally, all of them stressed the importance of Libyan efforts to deploy a proper border security body.

81. The proposed measures for enhancing border control in the Maghreb and the Sahel subregions, broken down under the three headings of legal and law enforcement measures, official entry and exit points and open borders, are the following:

(a) **Legal and law enforcement measures**

- (i) Harmonize national legislation and practices on the entry and stay of foreigners;
- (ii) Establish a mechanism for the coordination of police action and information exchange by States of the subregion;
- (iii) Strengthen regional police cooperation, including through joint training or periodic joint meetings;
- (iv) Enhance inter-State cooperation in criminal matters among States of the region;
- (v) Enhance internal coordination at the policy and operational levels;
- (vi) Enhance the exchange of information among the relevant security and law enforcement agencies;

(b) **Official entry and exit points**

- (i) Promote the establishment and equipping of multidisciplinary checkpoints at strategic border points, preferably by locating checkpoints of neighbouring States face-to-face, thereby allowing for the effective networking of the territory and, as appropriate, the handling, through networks, of information concerning persons crossing borders;
- (ii) Promote the signing of memorandums of understanding between departments responsible for controlling people at airports and airlines, on the receipt of advance passenger information for the purposes of risk analysis;
- (iii) Shift the focus of customs controls towards cargo security, in particular by developing a culture of security based on intelligence and combating transnational crime, including terrorism;
- (iv) Strengthen the capacities of the region's customs administrations through human resources training, and provide appropriate logistical support (scanners, infrastructures, detection equipment, etc.);
- (v) Raise awareness of the World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards and train officers in risk management with a view to modernizing customs administrations;

(c) **Open borders**

- (i) Analyse the risks and threats; develop targeting; and provide training in appropriate prevention and intelligence techniques;
- (ii) Train officers to engage with local populations (practices, dialects, cultures);
- (iii) Equip officers with communications equipment (satellite telephones, mobile radios, Global Positioning System, etc.) and mobile patrols that will enable them to be alert, and to react, to danger and train them in their use;
- (iv) Develop, wherever possible, centres for cross-border coordination and planning in neighbouring States, with a view to maximizing the use of limited resources.

Regional cooperation and information exchange

82. Despite the existence of a number of multilateral forums, the lack of a coordinated subregional strategy to fight terrorism and transnational criminal networks hampers collective efforts to address these issues.

83. At the regional level, Sahel countries established the regional judicial platform for the Sahel countries, which institutionalizes judicial cooperation in the region. At this stage, the platform includes Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, but the initiative is open to other Sahel countries. At the subregional level, counter-terrorism efforts are being addressed through a joint strategy developed by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. Nigeria and Chad will be invited to attend the next meetings and could become part of the strategy. The strategy sets out arrangements and principles to address subregional cooperation for security and development at four levels: regular political consultations; military cooperation (Committee of Joint Chiefs); intelligence cooperation (Liaison and Fusion Centre); and economic cooperation. Counter-terrorism activities cannot be limited to military action alone. Police action is also necessary to prevent and combat crimes of terrorism. According to the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, taking into account these developments, States in the region could also:

- (a) Enhance bilateral and regional cooperation, which can be effective only if agencies from different States speak the same “operational language” and use compatible tools;
- (b) Enhance regional training programmes in various disciplines (police, gendarmerie, customs, security) to enable officers to become familiar with compatible or common methods used by regional actors;
- (c) Share the experiences of States that have already engaged in conflict with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb with other States of the region that are susceptible to this threat.

84. Contributors to this working document would like to encourage States, particularly Libya’s neighbours and those of the region, to strengthen information exchange with the relevant Libyan authorities, as well as with the Panel, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, ICAO, UNSMIL and international partners, as appropriate, on the location, the stockpiling or the proliferation of arms and ammunitions emanating from Libya, including man-portable air defence

systems, and to collaborate closely with the Libyan authorities, UNSMIL and appropriate international and regional partners in the coordination and the rehabilitation of a strong border security and management regime along their common borders with Libya.

Combating the threat related to man-portable air defence systems

85. Preventing man-portable air defence systems from entering the illicit market and reaching terrorist or other groups requires a multilayered approach and involves the same measures as those regarding other light weapons, including controlling the stockpiling and the transfer of items and combating illicit trafficking. To maximize the effect of such a multilayered approach, a range of tools must be thoroughly coordinated to simultaneously address multiple threats. Efforts to mitigate vulnerability to attacks that involve the use of man-portable air defence systems are quite specific and involve airport-area security, countermeasures for aircraft and technical steps to improve the chances of aircraft landing successfully if hit.

Non-proliferation efforts

86. Member States must take the national and international measures required to prevent the illicit trafficking of military materiel, including the implementation of the arms embargo in relation to Libya. A range of initiatives related to small arms and light weapons control already exists at the national, regional and international levels to curb illicit trafficking. Several multilateral non-binding instruments exist, including the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the International Tracing Instrument and the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, through which States have committed to better control the manufacture, the transfer and the stockpile management of arms and to report information about their export and import, as well as to cooperate with one another in terms of information-sharing and tracing requests. States that have exported man-portable air defence systems to Libya in the past are encouraged to share information, as appropriate, through relevant channels with the Libyan authorities to assist in the accounting of unsecured man-portable air defence systems. Such information, as appropriate, could also be shared with the Committee and the Panel.

Preventing the threat of man-portable air defence systems by reinforcing related security measures at the airport level

87. ICAO member States, which include Libya and the States in the region, are obligated by international civil aviation security standards to keep the threat to civil aviation under constant review and to adjust their aviation security programmes appropriately as the threat changes. In view of concerns about the proliferation of man-portable air defence systems in Libya and the region, prudence would encourage Libya and States in the region to carefully assess the threat of man-portable air defence systems and introduce appropriate security risk mitigation measures based on internationally accepted methods and practices. Indeed, ICAO is aware that a programme to conduct assessments of man-portable air defence systems in Libya and neighbouring States is under way with the assistance of the United States and other States. Many countries, including the United States, have proposed to several regional countries to support them in enhancing the security of airports and their surrounding areas in order to mitigate the risks of a terrorist attack with man-portable air defence systems.

88. A “best practice” in man-portable air defence systems risk mitigation is the carrying out of airport-level vulnerability assessments and, on the basis of the results, implementation of airport-specific countermeasures. For this purpose, ICAO makes available to all of its member States the man-portable air defence systems information and vulnerability assessment guide (March 2010). The guide provides relevant information regarding the classification and the recognition of man-portable air defence systems, historical background on incidents, threat, availability, international anti-proliferation policies, targeting factors, vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies and the threat from stand-off weapons.
